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This paper shows how a series of commonly observed short-term CEO employment con-
tracts can improve cartel stability compared to a long-term employment contract. When
a manager’s short-term appointment is renewed if and only if the firm hits a certain
profit target, then (i) defection from collusion results in superior firm performance, thus
reducing the chance of being fired, while (ii) future punishment results in inferior firm
performance, thus increasing the chance of being fired in the future. The introduction
of this re-employment tradeoff intertwines with the usual monetary tradeoff and can im-
prove cartel stability. Studying the impact of fixed versus variable salary components, I
find that fixed components can facilitate collusion with a short-term contract, while not
affecting cartel stability with a long-term contract. Moreover, an extension of the model
shows that short-term, renewable contracts can be a source of cyclical collusive pricing.
Finally, interpreting the results in light of firm financing suggests that debt-financed
firms can form more-stable cartels than equity-financed firms.
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1 Introduction
The majority of the literature on cartels and collusion treats the firm as a profit-maximizing
decision maker, thereby deriving key insights on cartel stability and behavior from a profit-
maximizing perspective. However, cartels often involve firms having separated ownership
and control in such a way that the incentives of the key decision maker (CEO, manager) are
not fully aligned with those of the profit-maximizing shareholders. The resulting corporate
governance factors can have a key impact on the operation of cartels.1
This paper studies how short-term, renewable employment contracts affect cartel stability
and behavior. Although one may expect that short-sighted CEOs are incapable of running
a stable cartel,2 I show how short-termism generated through such contracts can in fact
improve cartel stability. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom that profit-dependent
remuneration can incentivize CEOs to misbehave, the model shows that short-term contracts
with fixed (as opposed to: variable) salary components can improve cartel stability.
From a sample of 375 CEO employment contracts of large public corporations, Schwab
and Thomas (2006) find that 81% specify a length of five years or less, with a mean of 3.6
years. Similarly, Gillian, Hartzell and Parrino (2009) find that the median and mean length
in a sample of 184 S&P 500 CEO contracts is 3.4 and 3.0 years, respectively. Moreover,
recent work by Jenter and Lewellen (2010) indicates that CEO turnover decisions are very
sensitive to stock price performance: from a sample of 2,569 publicly traded U.S. firms from
1992 to 2005, they find that 44% of CEOs left the firm within 4 years as a result of bad
firm performance.3 These empirical findings show that executives typically have a short-
term, renewable employment contract, that is, a contract for a finite period of time which is
renewed if and only if the firm performs sufficiently well.
In this paper, I take such a typical CEO contract as exogenously given and aim to un-
derstand its impact on the operation of cartels.4 Assuming that managerial remuneration as
well as the probability of contract renewal is positively related to firm profit, the manager can
stochastically increase profit by forming a cartel with rival firms, while even further stochas-
tically increasing profit by defecting from the collusive agreement. Two interrelated forces
then dictate cartel stability. The manager compares the immediate expected salary gain
resulting from defection, with the future expected salary losses resulting from punishment
1See Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) for a research agenda on corporate governance factors and collusion.
2For example, Aubert, Rey and Kovacic (2006) argue that short-term contracts may incentivize managers
to apply for leniency as they may leave the firm anyway; this effect tends to destabilize collusion.
3For additional evidence on the relationship of CEO turnover and firm performance, see Lausten (2002),
Farrell and Whidbee (2003), Jenter and Kanaan (2010), and Kaplan and Minton (2010).
4The model abstracts away from the underlying motivation of adopting short-term, renewable contracts
over long-term contracts or no contract at all. Such motivations include risk sharing or adverse selection—see
the papers referenced above.
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(monetary tradeoff). The manager also compares the immediate increase in the probability
of contract renewal resulting from the higher expected profit during defection, with the fu-
ture decrease in the probability of contract renewal resulting from the lower expected profits
during future punishment (re-employment tradeoff). While the monetary tradeoff parallels
the familiar problem faced by integrated, profit-maximizing firms engaging in cartelization,
the re-employment tradeoff originates from the manager’s fear of not being rehired.
Whether a series of short-term, renewable contracts strictly enhance cartel stability com-
pared to a long-term contract depends on two effects. First, the manager is unsure whether
he will be rehired even if he colludes and, hence, the game ends for him with some positive
probability: this is a collusion-destabilizing effect. Second, noting that after defection the
manager only cares about re-employment if the expected remuneration during punishment
is not too small, the re-employment tradeoff can dominate the collusion-destabilizing effect
if the probability of re-employment is relatively low during punishment, while the expected
remuneration during punishment is indeed not too small. This ensures that the manager
misses out (in expectation) on a substantial amount of future salary as he is fired in the
future with a high probability.
The model also shows how a fixed salary component can stabilize collusion when a short-
term contract is in place, while not affecting cartel stability when a long-term contract is in
place. The intuition is that with a long-term contract, the fixed salary component is paid
out in every period independent on managerial behavior and, therefore, does not affect the
manager’s incentives to collude. However, with a short-term contract, the fixed component is
only paid out in periods in which the manager is indeed working for the firm. The manager
anticipates that defection leads to a higher probability of being fired in the future—that is,
losing out on future fixed salary components—which may amount to a large expected loss
when he is relatively patient. In that case, the board of shareholders (more generally: the
principal) optimally makes the fixed component an important part of the manager’s salary
so as to stabilize collusion.
In addition, this paper studies the case in which managers may revert from punishment
to collusion when one of the managers is fired and replaced by another. The rationale behind
such “serial collusion” is that managerial replacement restores the trust needed for a cartel
to work. Such restoration of trust destabilizes collusion. The reason is that serial collusion
increases the continuation value of defection, because (i) defection instantaneously increases
the probability that the rival manager is fired, in which case collusion is immediately restored,
and (ii) punishment is less fierce as it ends when the rival manager is fired at some point.
Finally, I consider the case in which managers engage in multiple sequential interactions
within the span of the employment contract, thereby showing that short-term employment
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contracts may be an explanation for cyclical collusive pricing. Suppose, for example, that the
manager is halfway through his employment contract and has been colluding up until now,
but that earlier firm profits have been extremely low due to random market conditions. In
such a case, the profits during the second half of his employment contract should be extremely
high for the manager’s contract to be renewed. Since extremely high profits are very unlikely
to occur even with collusion, the manager anticipates that his contract is unlikely to be
renewed, resulting in defection from the collusive agreement. However, rational managers fix
such destabilization by ex ante agreeing that the collusive strategy entails collusion if and
only if earlier firm profits during the same employment contract have not been too low. The
optimal collusive strategy then entails waves of competition, i.e., price wars, in equilibrium.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3
presents the model, identifies the key tradeoff, and shows how short-term contracts can
increase cartel stability. Section 4 investigates the impact of fixed salary components and
serial collusion on cartel stability. Section 5 considers an employment contract covering
multiple interactions on the product market over the contractual period, thereby allowing for
cyclical collusive pricing. Section 6 reinterpret the results in light of firm financing, thereby
arguing how debt-financed firms can form more-stable cartels than equity-financed firms.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper relates to two strands of literature: (i) managerial incentives in cartels, and (ii)
collusion and price wars. I discuss how my work relates to each in turn.
Managerial incentives in cartels. This paper departs from the traditional literature on
cartels and collusion by separating the firm’s ownership and control so as to focus on the im-
pact of short-term contracts on cartel stability and behavior. The papers discussed hereafter
deal with the impact of several other common characteristics of managerial compensation on
cartels.5
Spagnolo (2000) shows that stock-related compensation improves the stability of collusion:
if stock markets have perfect foresight and are informed about the collusive agreement, then
future punishment following a defection is immediately discounted in current stock prices,
5The strategic delegation literature considers a related issue of how delegation affects the competitive out-
come on the product market. The seminal papers are Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), which
were preceded by Fershtman (1985) and Vickers (1985). Lambertini and Trombetta (2002), De Lamirande,
Guigou and Lovat (2011), and Han (2011) extend the seminal strategic delegation models to a repeated
setting so as to allow for collusion.
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thereby instantaneously reducing the gain from defection.6 Moreover, Spagnolo (2005) argues
that collusion is more stable when managers have a preference for income smoothing, that is,
when managers are provided with low-powered incentives so that they prefer a smooth stream
of profits over time. The manager is then averse to variance in profits, which disincentivizes
him to defect as that leads to a high profit today, followed by low punishment profits in the
future. Also, Spagnolo (2005) shows that well-chosen capped bonus plans allow collusion to
be stable for any discount factor, because the gain from defection will be capped. In contrast
to Spagnolo’s work, this paper specifically allows contracts to be finite, thereby introducing
a collusion-stabilizing tradeoff based on the manager’s fear to be fired.
Since cartels are illegal, a written contract between the firm owner and the manager that
explicitly induces the manager to form a cartel is not enforceable in court. Therefore, the firm
owner needs to rely on a relational contract with the manager to induce cartelization. Chen
(2008) shows how such a relational contract between the owner and the manager facilitates
collusion as (i) it prevents the manager to cheat on the product market, because defection
results in collusion breaking down in which case the owner will pay nothing to the manager
and the relational contract breaks down, while (ii) the owner cannot cheat on the relational
contract by inducing the manager to defect, because the owner cannot credibly commit to
rewarding the manager for a defection. Thus, Chen (2008) concludes that there exists no self-
enforcing relational contract that can induce the manager to cheat on the product market.
This paper, however, circumvents the need for a relational contract as contracting on profits
in a short-term contract introduces a new tradeoff that can be used to stabilize collusion.
The manager’s decision to form a cartel may interfere with other managerial duties.
Aubert (2009) builds an elegant model of double moral hazard in which the manager chooses
whether to exert costly effort which increases profits, while either competing or colluding
on the product market. In such a scenario, a high-powered incentive contract aimed at
inducing the manager to exert effort has the perverse effect of also inducing the manager to
form a cartel. This conflict between incentives results in equilibrium contracts inducing a
suboptimal effort level, leading to welfare losses even if there is no collusion in equilibrium.
In a similar model of (single) moral hazard, Angelucci and Han (2011) consider a three-tier
hierarchy, authority-shareholder-manager, so as to study the effects of intra-firm monitoring
on fighting corporate crime, such as cartels. While Aubert (2009) and Angelucci and Han
(2011) take a general approach to open up the black box of the profit-maximizing firm so
as to endogenously determine the optimal contract, this paper takes the short-termism and
renewability of observed CEO contracts as exogenously given.
6In a market with stochastic, autocorrelated demand development, Neubecker (2005) confirms Spagnolo’s
(2000) finding that stock-based compensation facilitates collusion.
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More generally, Bull (1987) and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002), for instance, study
relational contracts. They argue that such informal agreements and unwritten codes of
conduct are widespread within firms and have an important impact on the incentives of
individuals. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) show that the optimal allocation of decision
rights minimizes the maximum temptation to renege on relational contracts. This paper
takes the perspective of common formal, short-term, renewable CEO contracts.
Cartels and price wars. Empirical work shows that episodes of collusion often involve
price wars—see, for example, Slade (1990), Harrington (2006), and Levenstein and Suslow
(2006).7 As a founder of cartel theory, Stigler (1964) pointed out that prices are high during
cartelization, while out-of-equilibrium price wars occur after cartel breakdown. Since then,
many authors have contributed to explaining patterns of elevated prices and price wars in
equilibrium.
Such explanations include imperfect monitoring with demand uncertainty (Green and
Porter, 1984; Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1986), demand cyclicity (Rotemberg and Sa-
loner, 1986; Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991), learning about unknown demand parameters
with exogenous demand shocks (Slade, 1989), renegotiation of the collusive pie (Levenstein,
1997), and inducing exit of “dying” cartel members (Fershtman and Pakes, 2000).8 These
contributions treat the firm as profit-maximizing integrated entities.
In contrast, this paper presents an explanation for equilibrium price wars based on man-
agerial issues. Since executives’ compensation depends on their performance during the full
contractual employment period, they optimally condition their pricing decision on profits
realized earlier during their contractual employment period.
3 A Model of Cartel Stability with Short-Term Contracts
This section introduces the model (3.1); identifies the tradeoff associated with short-term con-
tracts and cartel stability (3.2); shows that short-term contracts can improve cartel stability
(3.3); and performs comparative statics of the key proposition (3.4).
7I follow the literature by using the term “price wars” for episodes of lower prices than the collusive price,
which can be caused by cartel break-down or endogenously arising as part of the collusive equilibrium.
8More recent contributions include the cartel members’ concerns about detection by the antitrust authority
(Harrington, 2004a), lifting prices after detection to push for lower damages in court (Harrington, 2004b),
and cost variability in the presence of buyer detection (Harrington and Chen, 2006).
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3.1 Set-up of the Model
Outline & players. Consider two firms i 2 {1, 2}, where each firm i is owned by share-
holder i who employs a manager i to run the firm. In an infinitely repeated game, the
managers interact with each other on the product market in each period t 2 {1, ...,1}. I
refer to shareholders in the female form (she/her), managers in the male form (he/his) and











Figure 1. The players: shareholders and managers.
Managerial action. In each period t 2 {1, ...,1}, both managers simultaneously decide
whether to compete or collude on the product market. Managerial behavior stochastically
affects the realization of the firms’ profits.9 Let profit of firm i in period t be a random
variable ⇡
t
  0 with cumulative distribution function (CDF)
F
a
(x) = Pr [⇡
t
 x| a] , 8x   0,
where a 2 {N,C,D, T} represents the combination of behavior of manager i and j on the
product market,
1. a = N if both managers compete (Nash competition);
2. a = C if both managers collude (Collusion);
3. a = D if manager i competes and manager j colludes (Defection by manager i);
4. a = T if manager i colludes and manager j competes (manager i has been Tricked,
because manager j defected).
9Gillian, Hartzell and Parrino’s (2009) empirical results show that an explicit short-term contract is more




(x) is increasing over the entire domain x   0, i.e., @Fa(x)
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> 0 has full support.
Defection is more profitable in expectation than collusion, which is, in turn, more profitable









for every x   0, with a strict inequality for at least one value of x. By definition of stochastic

































To stay in line with the literature and to focus on the impact of short-term contracts on
cartel stability, both managers adopt the grim-trigger collusive strategy: a manager colludes
as long as his rival colluded in all previous periods, but reverts to Nash forever after a
defection.
Shareholder’s actions. The shareholder appoints her manager for one period by offering
a contract that is renewed for another period if and only if the firm’s profit ⇡
t
is above some
threshold profit level ⇡ 2 [0,1) chosen by the shareholder in period t = 0. Otherwise,
the manager is fired and replaced by a new manager. This simple rule of perform well or
beat it is motivated by (i) observations of CEOs and managers being fired after bad firm
performance;10 (ii) the debate in academic journals as well as in the popular press that
shareholders are focused on the short-term;11 and (iii) the fact that the stock market allows
investors (shareholders) to invest in a variety of financial products, thus rationalizing the
shareholder to require a minimum threshold profit level that at least beats the stock market.12
In period t = 0, the shareholder also sets the managerial per-period salary scheme, con-
sisting of a fraction   2 [0, 1] of per-period profit ⇡
t
, plus a fixed component ↵   0 in each
period.13,14
10See, for example, Lausten (2002), Farrell and Whidbee (2003), and Jenter and Kanaan (2010).
11See, for example, Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006).
12Kaplan and Minton (2010) make the specific point that CEO replacement is related to firm performance
relative to the performance of the overall stock market.
13This paper does not consider shareholders colluding in setting managerial incentive schemes. See Lam-
bertini and Trombetta (2002) and Han (2011) for models in which firm owners collude on this.
14To focus on the impact of short-term managerial contracts on cartel stability, the model abstract away
from dynamic contracting and does not allow managerial compensation to be based on profit realizations in
previous or future periods. Section 5 considers the contract to be contingent on previous profit realizations;
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Information. Managerial behavior is observable to the rival manager, but unobservable
to shareholders. The motivation is that close managerial interaction on the product market
reveals their actions to each other. However, as cartels are illegal, it would be virtually im-
possible for managers to credibly communicate to shareholders that there is a cartel without
creating suspicion from the law enforcers.
Payoffs and objectives. In each period, the manager receives his salary, while the share-





















) = ↵ +  ⇡
t
.
The manager has limited liability, which is taken care of by ↵ and   being non-negative by
assumption. The shareholder and the manager are risk neutral, have zero outside options,
and discount payoffs with factor  . The manager’s objective is to maximize his discounted
stream of expected payoffs. The owner’s objective is to maximize cartel stability.15
Timing. In period t = 0, both shareholders independently set salary scheme (↵,  ), as well
as the threshold profit level ⇡ that a manager needs to realize to be reappointed. In all
subsequent periods t 2 {1, ...,1}, (i) the managers interact on the product market by taking
action pair a 2 {N,C,D, T}; (ii) firm profit ⇡
t
is realized; and (iii) the manager is either
fired or reappointed, depending on the realization of profit and the profit threshold level ⇡
set in period t = 0. The timing of the game is graphically depicted in Figure 2.












t 2 [1, 1)t = 0




z }| {z }| {
( ,  )
Figure 2. Timing of the game.
for compensation schemes based on future profit realizations, see Spagnolo (2000), discussed in Section 2.
15It is left for future work to consider the owner to maximize her discounted stream of expected payoffs.
The current model focuses on the impact of short-term contracts on cartel stability and behavior without
fully endogenizing the employment contract.
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3.2 Cartel Stability: Monetary and Re-employment Tradeoff
To focus on the main tradeoff, assume for now that managerial salary entails no fixed com-
ponent, i.e., ↵ = 0. Subsection 4.1 relaxes this assumption.
As usual in the literature on collusion, the measure of cartel stability is the lowest dis-
count factor   such that the gain from defection does not exceed the expected discounted
punishment: the lower is this discount factor, the more stable is the cartel.
Benchmark stability. Before solving the game outlined above, consider the benchmark
model in which the manager has a long-term employment contract: he is hired forever without

















































which represents the familiar result that collusion is stable if and only if the immediate
expected monetary gain from defection (C) is not larger than the expected monetary loss
from punishment in each future period (B), discounted to the present (A). Fraction   does
not turn up in the stability condition as it cancels out in each term.





(x) = Pr [⇡
t
  x| a] the probability of realizing profit ⇡
t
  x when the managers take
action combination a 2 {N,C,D, T}. Thus, given that the shareholder requires a profit of at
least ⇡, the probability of re-employment for another period is G
a
(⇡). The following lemma
states the stability of collusion in the model with short-term contracts.
































16In reality, even if the manager has a long-term employment contract, the shareholders may find some
way to fire the manager, for example, by creatively interpreting the just cause doctrine to terminate the
contract or to settle on an appropriate “golden handshake” with the manager. To focus on the impact of
contract duration on cartels, this paper abstracts away from such behavior and implicitly assume that the
termination costs of a long-term contract are infinitely high.
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Proof. Collusion is stable if and only if the discounted expected payoff from defection is not


















































which yields condition (3) when rearranging terms.
The stability condition in Lemma 1 compares the immediate expected gain from defec-
tion (RHS) with the discounted expected future losses from punishment (LHS). As is the
case in the benchmark stability condition, fraction   cancels out in each term. Stability
now depends on two interrelated tradeoffs: (i) the immediate expected monetary gain from
defection, compared with the discounted expected monetary loss from future punishment
(monetary tradeoff), and (ii) the immediate increase in re-employment probability from de-
fection, compared to the future decrease in re-employment probability due to punishment
(re-employment tradeoff).
The monetary tradeoff and the re-employment tradeoff are intertwined. To gain intuition,
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which shows that collusion is stable if and only if
(A) the immediate expected monetary gain from defection is not larger than
(B) the future per-period expected monetary loss from punishment, taking into account
(C) that the probability of re-employment is G
C
(⇡) in each equilibrium period, which
(D) increases to G
D
(⇡) in the period of defection, while
(E) decreasing to G
N
(⇡) in all following punishment periods.
Below, I describe the intuition behind these effects and how they compare to the effects in
the benchmark model.
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the same as in the benchmark model. The reason is that the immediate expected monetary
gain is not contingent on whether the manager will be rehired in the future.
(B) Monetary loss. Provided that a punishment period is reached, the per-period ex-








), is the same as in the benchmark
model, because the expectations over profit realizations do not change by allowing managers
to be fired.
(C) Continuation probability. In equilibrium, the probability that a manager is being
reappointed is G
C
(⇡) in each period, whereas this probability is one in the benchmark model.
When discounting the expected monetary losses from punishment (B) to the present, we
should, therefore, premultiply the discount factor by G
C
(⇡). This decreases the manager’s
discounted expected loss of future punishment compared to the benchmark model and, thus,
has a collusion-destabilizing effect.















(⇡). This effectively leads to a reduction in the expected loss from punishment,




) in condition (4).
This reduction in the loss from punishment amounts to destabilizing collusion.





(⇡) in all future periods. Therefore, not only decreases the expected
monetary payoff to E
N





(⇡). This makes punishment fiercer through an increase in the





) in condition (4). This increase in the loss from punishment amounts to
stabilizing collusion.
3.3 Short-Term Contracts Can Increase Cartel Stability
Given profit threshold level ⇡, Proposition 1 states the characteristics of the probability
distributions over profits F
a
(·) such that collusion with short-term contracts is more stable
than collusion with long-term contracts.
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Proposition 1 Collusion with short-term contracts and threshold profit level ⇡ is more stable



























Proof. Collusion is more stable compared to the benchmark model if and only if condition

































1     , (6)
which yields condition (5) when simplifying.
Short-term contracts stabilize collusion if and only if (i) the increase in reappointment




(⇡) is relatively small compared to the re-




(⇡) (RHS), while (ii)








) is not too large (LHS). The
intuition is based on the following three forces.
First, with a short-term contract, the manager is ex ante unsure whether he will be
rehired even if he colludes. This has a destabilizing impact on collusion as it incentivizes the
manager to deviate so as to grab as much salary as possible in the current period, while at
the same time increasing the immediate probability of re-employment.
Second, short-term contracts introduce the re-employment tradeoff, which has a stabiliz-
ing impact on collusion if and only if the immediate increase in re-employment probability
resulting from defection is small compared to the future reduction in re-employment proba-









(⇡). If the re-employment tradeoff is sufficiently positive for collusive stability,
it can offset the first force.
Third, the higher is the reduction in expected salary resulting from punishment, the less
does the manager care about being rehired in the future, that is, the lower is the impact of
the re-employment tradeoff, i.e., the second force.
Altogether, the re-employment tradeoff (force 2) stabilizes collusion by more than force
1 destabilizes collusion if and only if (i) the increase in reappointment probability during
defection is small compared to the decrease in reappointment probability during punishment,
provided that (ii) the monetary loss from punishment is not too large.
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Proposition 2 Short-term contracts can stabilize cartels compared to long-term contracts.
Proof. If condition (5) holds for some ⇡, then the shareholder chooses one of those ⇡ such
that (3) is satisfied. If condition (5) does not hold for any ⇡, then the shareholder sets ⇡ = 0,
thereby effectively mimicking a long-term contract.
When there exists a profit level such that condition (6) is satisfied, then the optimal
short-term contract stabilizes collusion. When no such profit level exists, the optimal short-
term, renewable contract replicates an indefinite employment contract by setting the profit
threshold level in such a way that even a manager that competes in the product market
will achieve that profit level, i.e., ⇡ = 0. A short-term contract then effectively mimics the
collusive stability associated with a long-term contract. In that case, a strict short-term,
renewable contract with ⇡ > 0 would actually destabilize collusion.
3.4 Comparative Statics
The only assumptions on profit distributions are full support over the domain ⇡
t
  0 and
first order stochastic dominance of defection over collusion over Nash. Therefore, any change
in profit distributions has an ambiguous impact on the direction as well as the size of the






(⇡). The ultimate impact on Proposition 1’s condition (5)







As a result, even very stylized comparative statics with respect to profit distributions
leads to a large number of cases entailing tedious analyses without generating substantive
insights in the model. The key point remains that changes in the parameters facilitate
collusive stability if (i) the increase in reappointment probability during defection becomes
smaller; (ii) the reduction in reappointment probability during punishment becomes larger;
or (iii) the monetary loss from punishment becomes smaller—see the first paragraph after
Proposition 1.
However, since the distribution over profit when defecting only appears once in condition
(5) in the form of G
D
(⇡), some meaningful comparative statics are possible.
Proposition 3 Cond. (5) is easier (more difficult) to satisfy if distribution F
D
(x) is
1. shifted to the left (right);



















Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is that changes entailing a reduction (increase) in G
D
(⇡), while not affecting
the other parameters, make condition (5) easier (more difficult) to satisfy, because such
changes make defection more attractive to the manager in the sense that the probability of
re-employment increases after a defection.
4 Fixed Salary Components and Serial Colluders
This section considers the impact on cartel stability of fixed salary components (4.1), as well
as the possibility to revert from punishment to collusion after replacement of a manager,
which I refer to as “serial collusion” (4.2).
4.1 Fixed Salary Components Can Stabilize Cartels
This subsection relaxes the assumption that contracts contain no fixed salary component,
that is, the shareholders are now free to set any ↵   0 and     0. This shows that a fixed
salary component affects cartel stability when short-term contracts are in place, but not when
long-term contracts are in place.
Benchmark stability. First, consider long-term contracts. With long-term contracts,
there exists a rather trivial optimal solution in which   = 0, because then the manager is
indifferent between all possible actions as he is hired forever and earns ↵ in every period.
He has no incentives to defect, which makes collusion stable for all discount factors. This
solution is not so interesting; therefore, I assume   > 0 from now on.
When   > 0 the stability with long-term contracts is unchanged when allowing for a fixed
salary component, because collusion is stable if and only if
 
1     [(↵ +  EC (⇡t))   (↵ +  EN (⇡t))]   (↵ +  ED (⇡t))   (↵ +  EN (⇡t)) ,
iff.
 
1     (EC (⇡t)   EN (⇡t))   ED (⇡t)   EC (⇡t) , (7)
which is equivalent to benchmark stability condition (2). The reason is that the fixed salary
component is paid out in every period and, thus, cancels out.
Stability with short-term, renewable contracts. The following lemma states the sta-
bility condition with short-term contracts and a fixed salary component.
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where K = GC(⇡)1  GC(⇡)  
GD(⇡)
1  GN (⇡) .
Proof. Collusion is stable if and only if the discounted expected payoff from defection is not

































which gives condition (8) when rearranging terms.
For now, note that this stability condition differs from the stability condition without
the fixed salary component in Lemma 1 by the term  K ↵
 
on the LHS. I provide intuition
for this difference below. Defining  ̃ = GD(⇡) GC(⇡)
GC(⇡)(GD(⇡) GN (⇡)) , the following lemma states the
optimal salary scheme from the shareholder’s perspective and the impact of the fixed salary
component ↵ on the stability of collusion.
Lemma 3 If   >  ̃, collusion is stable and the optimal wage schedule entails an arbitrarily
small fraction of firm profit   > 0 and a positive fixed salary component ↵ > 0. If     ̃,
collusion is stable if and only if condition (3) holds and the optimal wage schedule entails an
arbitrarily small fraction of firm profit   > 0 and a zero fixed salary component ↵ = 0.
Proof. We have that K > 0 ,   >  ̃. Therefore, if   >  ̃, the LHS of condition (8) can be
made arbitrarily large by setting ↵ to any positive value and   arbitrarily small. However, if
    ̃, it is best to set ↵ = 0 (because K < 0), and collusion is stable if and only if condition
(3) holds.
The intuition for this result runs as follows. Dividing all managerial payoffs by  , we have









cancels out in “the gain from defection”—i.e., the RHS of condition (8)—
because the fixed component is being paid in the current period independent of managerial
behavior, that is, independent of whether the manager colludes or defects. However, the
fixed component does not cancel out in the “future losses from punishment”—i.e., the LHS
16
of condition (8)—because the manager is being paid the fixed component in a future period
if and only if the manager is actually hired in that future period, the probability of which
depends on whether the manager colludes or defects in the current period.
If the “future losses from punishment with regard to the fixed component” is positive, i.e.,
if K > 0, then it is optimal for the shareholder to set ↵ > 0 so as to use the fixed salary
component to increase stability. The shareholder can amplify this effect by making the
fixed component a relatively important part of the wage schedule compared to the variable
component, that is, by setting   sufficiently small relative to ↵. Note that if   >  ̃, stability
does not depend on the size of ⇡, because the shareholder can play around with ↵ and   to
make collusion stable for every ⇡. The next Proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4 Allowing for a salary scheme with a fixed component weakly stabilizes collu-
sion with short-term contracts, while not affecting collusive stability with long-term contracts.
Proof. If  ̃ satisfies condition (3), then we know from Lemma 3 that it is optimal to set
↵ = 0, resulting in condition (3) and (8) to be equivalent. If  ̃ violates condition (3), then
we know from Lemma 3 that it is optimal to set ↵ > 0, resulting in condition (8) to hold
for a larger set of discount factor than condition (3). From (7) we know that a fixed salary
component does not affect collusive stability.
4.2 Serial Colluders Destabilize Cartels
This subsection assumes that managers revert from punishment to collusion after one of the
managers has been replaced during the punishment phase. The motivation is that mistrust
may be eliminated when a new manager is appointed; when a new manager enters the firm,
he starts with a “clean sheet” and will restore collusion with his rival.
Proposition 5 If replacement of a manager during the punishment regime results in the
newly appointed manager to switch to collusion with his rival, then collusion is stable for less
discount factors than if collusion is not restored after a managerial replacement.
Proof. Let V
C
= EC(⇡t)1  GC(⇡) be the manager’s continuation value of the collusive state. When








) be the continuation value of





the probability of hitting at least profit level ⇡ when the rival manager defected from the
collusive agreement.



























































































If a manager can switch from punishment to collusion with a newly appointed rival man-
ager, this effectively results in the continuation value of defection to increase for two reasons.
First, defection results in an immediate reduction in the probability that the rival manager is
reappointed, that is, an increase in the probability that a new rival manager is appointed and
collusion is restored instantaneously.17 Second, the continuation value of defection is higher
as in each punishment period collusion will be restored with probability G
N
(⇡). In essence,
Proposition 5 echoes McCutcheon (1997) who argues that meetings facilitate renegotiation,
which effectively reduces the scope for punishment and thereby destabilizes collusion.
5 Short-Term Contracts Entail Equilibrium Price Wars
Typically, CEO contracts span several years.18 Therefore, this section studies the model
when managers interact multiple times on the product market within the course of their
contractual employment period. This allows for dynamic pricing in the sense that a manager
may find it optimal to make his behavior during his employment period contingent on profit
realizations occurring earlier within the same contractual period.
5.1 Set-up of the Dynamic Model
To keep the analysis clean and to focus on the impact of multiple interactions within the
same employment period on cartel behavior, managers are assumed to interact on the prod-
uct market twice during their employment period, and that they do not discount their payoffs
17In the extreme case in which GT = 0, collusion is unstable for every discount factor   2 [0, 1] as
defection automatically results in a new rival manager being appointed immediately: collusion is restored
instantaneously and no punishment occurs.
18See, for example, Schwab and Thomas (2006) and Gillian, Hartzell and Parrino (2009).
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within the employment period. More than two interactions within the same contractual pe-
riod and within-contract discounting would not bring essential insights, while mathematically
complicating the model substantially.
Consider the model as outlined in Subsection 3.1, but now suppose that each period
t 2 {1, 2, ...,1} consists of two sequential stages k 2 {1, 2}. In both stages, the managers
take action pair a
k
2 {N,C,D}, resulting in profit ⇡k
t
  0, and the manager is reappointed




  ⇡. The conditional probability distributions
over profit are the same as outlined in Subsection 3.1 and independent between periods and
stages. Also, as before, managerial behavior is observed by the rival manager immediately
after taking the action, thus allowing for punishment during the next interaction. The new
timing of the game is depicted in Figure 3.
In terms of notation, define G





  ⇡| a1, a2] as the ex ante probability
of realizing at least aggregate profit ⇡ in period t, provided that the managers take action

















for ease of notation, which then simply writes as E
a
.








that is, the difference in re-employment probability between defection and collusion increases
in the profit threshold ⇡. This means that increasing the profit threshold ⇡ reduces the
probability of re-employment more when colluding than when defecting.




























k = 1 k = 2
( ,  )
t 2 {1, 2, ...,1}
Figure 3. Timing of the dynamic game.
5.2 Collusion in Both Stages
The most straightforward grim-trigger collusive strategy is to collude in both stages as long
as the rival manager colluded in all previous stages in all previous periods, while punishing
forever otherwise. The stability of this strategy is pinned down by the following lemma.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
For a collusive strategy to be stable in the dynamic model, the manager must (i) not




  0. Consider first the managerial incentive to defect in stage 2. The monetary tradeoff is
independent of the profit realization in stage 1: defection immediately increases the manager’s








in each future punishment
stage. However, the re-employment tradeoff does depend on the profit realization in stage 1:













(⇡) in each future punishment
period. Since defection increases the immediate re-employment probability more the higher
is the profit level that needs to be attained (by the regularity condition), the manager finds it
most attractive to defect when the profit realization in the first stage was the lowest realization
possible—i.e., ⇡1
t
= 0—because then he must hit a high profit of at least ⇡   ⇡1
t
= ⇡ in the
second stage, the probability of which is substantially increased when defecting.
Consider now the managerial incentive to defect in stage 1. This is lower than the manage-
rial incentive to defect in stage 2 after the realization of profit ⇡1
t
= 0. The reason is two-fold.





while after the realization of a zero profit in stage 1 the manager has only one interaction
left to attain ⇡2
t
  ⇡. Second, defection in stage 1 is immediately followed by punishment in
stage 2 without intra-period discounting, while defection in stage 2 is followed by punishment
in the next period, which entails discounting.
Combining the arguments, collusion in both stages is a stable strategy if and only if the
manager is patient enough not to defect in the second stage after the realization of a zero
profit in the first stage, which is represented by condition (10).
5.3 Collusion Conditional on Profit Realization in Stage 1
The dynamic nature of the game allows the manager to condition his action in the second
stage on the profit realization in the first stage. By the argument based on the regularity
condition in the previous subsection, if the manager is patient enough to collude in stage
2 after profit realization ⇡1
t
= ⌧ , then he is also patient enough to collude in stage 2 after
profit realization ⇡1
t




< ⌧ . The intuition is that the closer is stage 1’s profit realization to
the profit threshold ⇡, the less attractive is defection in terms of increasing the immediate
re-employment probability.
Compared to collusion in both stages, the manager potentially increases cartel stability by
adopting a strategy that entails collusion in stage 2 only after profit realization ⇡1
t
  ⌧ , which
I define as ⌧ -conditional collusion. The reason is that the stability of collusion in both periods
is determined by the manager’s incentive to defect in stage 2 after a zero profit realization in
stage 1, while ⌧ -conditional collusion removes this concern as the manager competes as part
of the collusive strategy for all ⇡1
t
< ⌧ . The next two subsections investigate the stability of
⌧ -conditional collusion in stage 2 when the manager either colludes or competes in stage 1.
Collusion in stage 1 and conditional collusion in stage 2. Consider the collusive
strategy in which the manager colludes in stage 1, while colluding in stage 2 if and only
if ⇡1
t






= x| a = C)G
C






= x| a = C)G
N
(⇡   x) dx, & denote the ex
ante expected per-period payoff as K
C









lowing lemma pins down the stability of this strategy.




















































and is potentially more stable than collusion in both stages.
Proof. See Appendix C.
By the regularity condition, the lower is stage 1’s profit realization, the more attractive
is defection in stage 2. Thus, the critical constraint for the manager’s equilibrium behavior
in stage 2 to be stable is determined by the lowest possible profit realization in stage 1
that still entails collusion in stage 2, that is, profit realization ⇡1
t
= ⌧ . This constraint
is represented by condition (12): ⌧ -conditional collusion in stage 2 (i) potentially makes
collusion more stable than sure collusion in stage 2 as defection entails a lower increase in
re-employment probability, that is G
D
(⇡   ⌧)   G
C





may also decrease collusive stability as the equilibrium payoff is lower than collusion in both
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, and its equilibrium continuation probability is lower, that
is P
C
(⇡, ⌧) < G
CC
(⇡). The net effect depends on the precise specification of the density
functions over profit and the level of ⌧ .
If the manager is patient enough to collude in stage 2 after ⇡1
t
  ⌧ , he is not necessarily
also patient enough to collude in stage 1. The intuition is that in stage 1, the manager has two




  ⇡, while in stage 2 the binding constraint
prescribes that the manager has one interaction to achieve profit ⇡2
t
  ⇡   ⌧ . Depending on
the precise specification of the density functions over profit and the level of ⌧ , the constraint
in stage 1, i.e., (11), may or may not be the binding constraint.
Competition in stage 1 and conditional collusion in stage 2. If constraint (11)
is the binding constraint for collusion in stage 1 and ⌧ -conditional collusion in stage 2 to
be stable, the manager may circumvent this and increase stability by constructing a collu-
sive agreement that entails competition in stage 1 and ⌧ -conditional collusion in stage 2.
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= x| a = N)G
N
(⇡   x) dx, and denote the











lemma pins down the stability of this strategy.























and is potentially more stable than (i) collusion in both stages, and (ii) collusion in stage 1
and ⌧ -conditional collusion in stage 2.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Stability is not a concern in the first stage, simply because the collusive strategy prescribes
competition in stage 1. Similarly to the argument presented in the previous subsection, the
binding constraint for the collusive strategy to be stable in the second stage is determined
by profit realization ⇡1
t
= ⌧ . If constraint (11) is the binding constraint in Lemma 5, then
competition in stage 1 instead of collusion in stage 1 increases cartel stability provided that
constraint (13) is satisfied for a larger set of discount factors than constraint (11), which
depends on the precise specification of the density functions over profit and the level of ⌧ .
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5.4 Equilibrium Price Wars, Stability, and Profitability
This subsection collects the results from the previous three lemmas and summarizes the
behavioral implications when the managers adopt a strategy with ⌧ -conditional collusion in
stage 2.
Proposition 6 Short-term contracts spanning multiple managerial interactions on the prod-
uct market can entail price wars in equilibrium, thereby increasing cartel stability, while
reducing cartel profitability.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Consider a manager colluding in both periods. Then, the critical constraint for collusion
to be stable is whether the manager is patient enough to collude in stage 2 after a low
profit realization in stage 1, because the manager has only one opportunity left to attain
its contractual profit threshold level. However, if this jeopardizes cartel stability, then the
managers may fix stability by adopting a collusive strategy in which they always collude in
the first stage, while colluding in the second stage only if profit realization in the first stage
was relatively high. In that way, they eliminate the concern of defection after a low profit
realization, because the collusive equilibrium itself already specifies competition after a low
profit realization.
It may be the case that such a strategy is still not stable, because the managers have
incentives to defect in the first stage now. Then, the managers can change their strategy and
compete in stage 1 as part of the collusive equilibrium, while colluding in stage 2 only if the
profit realization in stage 1 is high enough.
Both strategies entail competition (price wars) as part of the collusive equilibrium. Al-
though such price wars increase cartel stability, they decrease cartel profitability, because
by stochastic dominance (i) expected profit of competition is lower than expected profit of
collusion, and (ii) the continuation probability of collusion in both stages is higher than the
continuation probability when the manager competes in the second (and possibly: the first)
stage with some probability.
6 How Debt-Financed Firms Can Form Stable Cartels
The model can also be interpreted in light of firm financing, thereby showing how firms that
are financed by debt, i.e., highly leveraged firms, can form more-stable cartels than firms
financed by equity. This finding is consistent with Schleifer and Vishny (1992) and Khanna
and Tice (2000), although through a different mechanism.
23
In the spirit of the model presented in this paper, consider the stylized situation of a firm
fully financed by short-term debt. Assume that (i) the bank liquidates this firm immediately
if it misses out on a periodical repayment, and (ii) all the profits left after the repayment
are reinvested in the firm. Thus, to meet its repayment obligations, this debt-financed firm
must each year make a profit of at least the amount that needs to be repaid. If such a firm
colludes with its rivals, it faces the following tradeoff: defection makes it more likely to meet
its current repayment obligation (due to a higher expected profit in the current period), but
punishment makes it less likely to meet its future payment obligations (due to lower expected
profits in future punishment periods). In other words, defection makes liquidation less likely
in the current period, but more likely in future periods. This parallels the managerial tradeoff
that defection makes being fired less likely in the current period, but more likely in future
periods. Therefore, debt contracts can be designed in such a way to stabilize collusion and
may be a source of cyclical pricing.19
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a mechanism through which commonly observed short-term, re-
newable employment contracts can improve cartel stability, while dynamically affecting firms’
pricing behavior. Motivated by empirical observations, the model takes such short-term, re-
newable contracts as exogenously given, thereby abstracting away from the question which
type of employment contracts would endogenously arise when the shareholders’ main goal is
to induce the CEO to either form or stay away from a cartel. This issue is at the center of
the analysis in Aubert (2009) and Angelucci and Han (2011).
The model assumes that managers can observe each other’s actions. However, if managers
would not be able to observe the rival’s action, Green and Porter (1984) suggest that the
collusive strategy entails reversion to Nash for some periods after a low profit realization. How
such unobservability of actions interacts with the impact of short-term, renewable contracts
on cartel stability is left for future research.
In the current model, the shareholder’s strategy to hire a new manager when profit turns
out to be low is rational, because hiring costs are assumed to be zero and all managers are
of the same type. It is then costless to hire a new manager. In contrast, if hiring costs are
positive,20 one may expect the current manager to haggle with the shareholder to renew his
contract after a low profit realization; this is work for future research.
19Apart from the described forces, another important force is that liquidation of the firm will result in a
change of market structure, which would ex ante affect incentives. The impact of this force on overall cartel
stability is an interesting avenue to explore in future research.
20This may be due to, for example, search costs or costs associated with drafting a new contract.
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The model treats a long-term contract as an infinite contract such that the manager
is never dismissed, thereby implicitly assuming that the termination cost of a long-term
contract is infinitely high. However, sometimes a long-term contract can be terminated by
paying some fixed firing cost, such as a “golden parachute”. In such cases, a long-term contract
may display the same collusion-stabilizing effect as a short-term contract as the contract is
then effectively not indefinite.
Finally, the mechanism outlined in this paper implicitly assumes that employment con-
tracts are observable to rival managers. Although recently, more and more firms publish the
remuneration package and employment conditions of their executives, this may not always be
the case. When rivals’ employment contracts are not observable, then correct beliefs about
these contracts may still induce the cartel-stabilizing mechanism.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3
(1) Shifting F
D
(x) to the left (right) increases (decreases) G
D
(⇡), which in turn increases







dispersed increases (decreases) G
D
(⇡), which in turn increases (decreases) the LHS of condi-






(x) more (less) dispersed decreases (increases)
G
D
(⇡), which in turn decreases (increases) the LHS of condition (5). ⌅
B Proof of Lemma 4



















while, given the realization of ⇡1
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for every profit realization ⇡1
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) is increasing in ⇡1
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⇥ (⇡   ⇡1
t
)
is also increasing in ⇡1
t
by regularity condition (9). Thus, Subcondition (15) is most difficult
to satisfy if ⇡1
t
























Is (16) more difficult to satisfy than Subcondition (14)? Subtracting the LHS of (14)



















































































































































(⇡   x) dx, (21)
where (17) follows by definition, (18) follows by splitting up the integral, (19) follows by
noting that G
C

































































= x| a = D) dx, and (ii) G
C
(⇡   x)   G
N
(⇡   x)






1  GNN (⇡) , we have A > 0
and, thus, (16) is the binding constraint. ⌅
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C Proof of Lemma 5
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Given the realization of ⇡1
t






























































for every profit realization ⇡1
t
  ⌧ . By the regularity condition, this boils down to combined
conditions (11) and (12) in Lemma 5.






(⌧), we have that (11) is more difficult
to satisfy than (14). However, constraint (14) is not the binding constraint for the “always
collusion strategy” to be stable; constraint (15) with ⇡1
t
= 0 is the binding constraint. Thus,
constraint (11) does not make the “⌧ conditional collusion strategy” less stable than strategy




= 0, which depends on the precise specification of the density functions.
Fixing ⇡1
t
  0, constraint (12) is more difficult to satisfy than constraint (15), because






(⌧). However, depending on the precise specification of the
density functions, constraint (12) may be easier to satisfy than constraint (15), because (i)
both constraints are more difficult to satisfy the lower is ⇡1
t
; and (ii) constraint (15) needs to
be satisfied for every ⇡1
t





Thus, depending on the precise specification of the density functions, choosing an appro-
priate ⌧ potentially results in both constraints (11) and (12) to be satisfied for a larger set
of discount factors than constraint (15). ⌅
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D Proof of Lemma 6
Given the realization of ⇡1
t































































for every profit realization ⇡1
t
  ⌧ . By the regularity condition, we have that the above
constraint is most difficult to satisfy if ⇡1
t
= ⌧ ; thus, stability is determined by condition (13)
in Lemma 6. ⌅
E Proof of Proposition 6
First claim: price wars in equilibrium. The collusive strategies described in Lemmas 5 and
6 entail competition in stage 2 after the realization of profit ⇡1
t
< ⌧ in stage 1; also, the
collusive strategy described in Lemma 6 always entails competition in stage 1. Moreover, the
collusive strategies described in Lemmas 5 and 6 are potentially more stable than collusion
in both stages. Thus, contracts that span multiple managerial interactions potentially entail
price wars in equilibrium.
Second claim: if managers adopt a strategy entailing price wars in equilibrium, then cartel
stability is increased. The collusive strategies described in Lemmas 5 and 6 are potentially
more stable, but entail a lower profitability—see the proof below. Thus, if managers adopt
such a strategy, it means that they are not patient enough to collude in both stages, and thus
adopt a strategy entailing equilibrium price wars, while compromising on cartel profitability.
Third claim: price wars reduce cartel profitability. The profitability of (i) collusion in both
stages; (ii) collusion in stage 1 and ⌧ -conditional collusion in stage 2; and (iii) competition
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